

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON – NOTHERN DIVISION

THE ESTATE OF CRYSTALLINE
BARNES

c/o Lenda Burns
Personal Representative
2215 Redbud Lane
Jackson, MS 39212


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Civil Action No.: 3:18-cv-644-CWR-LRA

MINOR CHILD J.H.

c/o Lenda Burns
Legal Guardian
2215 Redbud Lane
Jackson, MS 39212

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MINOR CHILD K.B.

c/o Lenda Burns
Legal Guardian
2215 Redbud Lane
Jackson, MS 39212

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*
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Plaintiffs,

*

v.

*

OFFICER RAKASHA ADAMS

in her official capacity as a police officer for
the Jackson Police Department, and in her
personal capacity
327 E Pascagoula Street
Jackson, MS 39205

*
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*

OFFICER ALBERT TAYLOR

in his official capacity as a police officer for
the Jackson Police Department, and in his
personal capacity
327 E Pascagoula Street
Jackson, MS 39205

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*

OFFICER ERIC MORRIS

in his official capacity as a police officer for
the Jackson Police Department, and in his
personal capacity
327 E Pascagoula Street

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*
*

DOWNNS COLLINS, P.A.
20 S. Charles Street
Suite 901
Baltimore, MD 21201
O: (410) 462-4529
F: (410) 995-7200

Jackson, MS 39205 *

CITY OF JACKSON *
219 South President Street *
Jackson, MS 39205 *

Defendants. *

* * * * *

COMPLAINT

COMES NOW, The Estate of Crystalline Barnes, minor child, **KB.**, and minor child **K.H.**, by and Lenda Burns, the personal representative of the foregoing Estate and the legal guardian of the foregoing minor children (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), by and through their attorneys, Jason G. Downs, Esquire and Tiffani S. Collins, Esquire, and Carlos E. Moore, filing this Complaint against Rakasha Adams ("Defendant Adams"), Albert Taylor ("Defendant Taylor"), Eric Morris (Defendant Morris), and the City of Jackson ("Defendant City"), (collectively, "Defendants").

NATURE OF THE CASE

1. This civil action is brought under 42 U.S.C. §§1983 and 1988, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
2. This civil action seeks money damages and injunctive relief for the Jackson Police Department's (JPD's) pattern and practice of using unlawful and excessive force against persons in violation of their constitutional right to be free from such unlawful force.
3. JPD's pattern and practice of using excessive force cultivated an environment that led to Defendants Adams and Taylor's unlawfully slaying Crystalline Barnes ("Ms. Barnes") by shooting her in the lower back, in the back of her neck, and in the back of the head.

4. After Defendants Adams and Taylor unlawfully killed Ms. Barnes, Defendants Adams,

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Taylor, and Morris (“Defendant Officers”) conspired to cover up the truth and falsify a police report in an effort to obstruct justice. This falsified police report is contradicted by forensic evidence.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5. This court has jurisdiction over the claims in this complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343.
6. The venue in this court is proper under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b).
7. Plaintiff provided timely notice to the appropriate Defendants.

PARTIES

8. Plaintiff K.B. is the 2-year-old minor child of Ms. Barnes. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Plaintiff K.B. was a resident of Jackson, Mississippi. Lenda Burns is the legal guardian for Plaintiff K.B.
9. Plaintiff J.H. is the 6-year-old minor child of Ms. Barnes. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Plaintiff J.H. was a resident of Jackson, Mississippi. Ms. Burns is the legal guardian for Plaintiff J.H.
10. Ms. Burns is the personal representative of Plaintiff Estate of Crystalline Barnes. At the time of her untimely death, Ms. Barnes was a 21-year-old year old resident of Jackson, Mississippi and the mother of Plaintiffs J.H. and K.B.
11. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Rakasha Adams is/was a police officer with the JPD, acting under color of law as a police officer pursuant to policies, practices, customs, and usages of the JPD and the City of Jackson and within the scope of her employment with Defendant City. She is being sued in her official capacity as a police officer for the JPD and in her personal capacity.

12. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Albert Taylor is/was a police officer with the JPD, acting under color of law as a police officer pursuant to policies, practices, customs, and usages of the JPD and the City of Jackson and within the scope of his employment with Defendant City. He is being sued in his official capacity as a police officer for the JPD and in his personal capacity.

13. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Eric Morris is/was a police officer with the JPD, acting under color of law as a police officer and within the scope of his employment with Defendant City. He is being sued in her official capacity as a police officer for the JPD and in her personal capacity.

14. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant City was a municipal corporation and governmental entity within the meaning of the federal and Mississippi State Constitutions. Defendant City, through its departments, agents, servants and or employees, conducted certain police functions within the geographical borders of the State of Mississippi. Defendant City was responsible for hiring police officers, including, but not limited to, Defendant Officers. Defendant City exercised policy-making authority for the JPD; established the policies and procedures for screening, hiring, appointing, training, monitoring, and supervising police officers at the JPD; and enforced the duties, conduct, and discipline of police officers and other employees at the JPD. The JPD is a department of the City of Jackson Government which was responsible for, and through its agents, servants and/or employees undertook, police functions in the City of Jackson. Defendant Officers were agents, servants or employees of the JPD and the City of Jackson during the subject encounter giving rise to the various claims asserted

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herein. Defendant City is accordingly named as a party and a substitute party defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS RELATED TO ALL CLAIMS

15. Between December 1, 2016 and Ms. Barnes' shooting on January 27, 2018, there were at least 6 different officer-involved shootings where JPD officers fired at suspects, thereby using deadly force.

16. During the foregoing timeframe, the City of Jackson had approximately 450 police officers and a population of approximately 170,000 people.

17. The statistical frequency at which JPD officers use deadly force eclipses that of one of the recognized deadliest police departments in the country, the Chicago Police Department ("CPD").

18. The CPD, which is the second largest police department in the United States, averaged approximately 43 police-involved shootings per year. During the timeframe where CPD averaged 43 police-involved shootings per year, there were more than 12,200 police officers on CPD's force policing a population of approximately 2.7 million people.

19. A comparison of shootings per 100 officers in each respective city shows CPD averages .3525 per 100 officers while JPD averages a staggering 1.555 shootings per 100 officers. Stated simply, JPD officers shoot citizens at a rate more than 4.4 times more frequently than CPD.

20. The disparity is even more dramatic when the analysis focuses on population. CPD averages .0159 shootings per 1,000 citizens. JPD averages .41176 shootings per 1,000 citizens. In other words, Jackson citizens are more than 25.8 times more likely to be shot by a police officer than Chicago citizens. The undisputed statistics show that JPD is deadlier than CPD, a police department that has already been deemed by the United States Department of Justice of

engaging in a pattern and practice of excessive force.

21. JPD's rate of using deadly force is symptomatic of a policy, practice or custom of using excessive force.

22. JPD and Defendant City failed to take any action to properly psychologically screen, train, and discipline officers for violations of JPD General Orders prior to Ms. Barnes' shooting.

23. One of the JPD officer-involved shootings predating Ms. Barnes' shooting occurred on or about November 17, 2017. On that instance, Defendant Adams shot and killed a man that was alleged to be loitering near the intersection of Mayes Street and Lampton Avenue.

24. After shooting and killing the foregoing man, Defendant Adams was placed on a brief period of administrative leave and was allowed to return to work before being psychologically fit for duty.

25. Defendant Adams describes herself by saying, "I have emotional numbness... [i]ncreased arousal, such as difficulty sleeping and concentrating, feeling jumpy, and being easily irritated and angered."

26. Seventy-two days after killing a man near the intersection of Mayes Street and Lampton Avenue, Defendant Adams encountered Ms. Barnes.

27. On or about January 27, 2018, Ms. Barnes was driving her vehicle near the intersection of Fernwood Drive and Overstreet Avenue.

28. Ms. Barnes had not committed any violent offense, was not wanted for any violent offense, and had no JPD officer had any reason to believe Ms. Barnes posed a safety threat to anyone.

29. At this time, Defendants Adams and Taylor were safely inside of their vehicles.

30. As Ms. Barnes drove her vehicle forward, Defendants Taylor and Adams exited their vehicles and positioned themselves to the sides and rear of Ms. Barnes' vehicle.

31. No reasonable law enforcement officer would have exited their vehicle and similarly positioned themselves under similar circumstances.

32. In violation of JPD General Orders and in violation of the actions of a reasonable police officer, Defendants Taylor and Adams fired multiple shots through the sides and rear of Ms. Barnes' vehicle.

33. Ms. Barnes did not pose a safety threat to either officer as the officers were on the side and rear of Ms. Barnes's vehicle at the time the officers fired their weapons.

34. Defendants Taylor and Adams shot Ms. Barnes in the lower back, back of the neck and the back of her head.

35. At the time where Defendants Adams and Taylor shot Ms. Barnes from behind, they seized her within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The officers did not have a particularized or objective suspicion that Plaintiff was armed and dangerous nor did they have probable cause that she had committed any crime.

36. At the time that Defendants Adams and Taylor encountered Plaintiff, the law established that law enforcement officers shall not stop citizens without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, shall not use excessive force in detaining or arresting citizens, and shall not use deadly force on suspects that do not pose a significant threat of death or serious bodily harm to the officer or others.

37. Defendants Adams and Taylor's acts of firing at the sides of Plaintiff's vehicle and shooting her from behind were undertaken with actual malice, ill will, improper motive, gross negligence, or a reckless disregard for the consequences.

38. After Defendants Taylor and Adams shot Ms. Barnes from behind, Defendant Morris arrived on the scene.

39. Defendant Officers discussed this incident and agreed on an untrue version of events in order to cover up the truth and obstruct justice.

40. Defendant Morris wrote an incident report that is purposefully misleading in furtherance of his agreement with Defendants Taylor and Adams, including advancing inaccurate allegations that are contradicted by forensic evidence.

41. One of the misleadingly inaccurate accusations advanced by Defendant Morris is that Ms. Barnes “sped towards one of the officers and the officer feared for his life and discharged her weapon.”

42. There were no bullet holes to the front of Ms. Barnes’ vehicle.

43. After being shot from behind as she drove forward, Ms. Barnes’ vehicle crashed headfirst into a pole.

44. Ms. Barnes died from the foregoing gunshot wounds.

COUNT I
Excessive Force
42 U.S.C. §1983
Plaintiffs v. Defendants Adams and Taylor

45. Plaintiffs refer to, and incorporate by reference, paragraphs 1 through 45 as if fully set forth herein.

46. Ms. Barnes had a constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be free from, to be secure in her person and to maintain her bodily integrity against unreasonable assaults of her person and excessive force.

47. Ms. Barnes had a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment in personal security, bodily integrity and freedom from unjustified intrusions on personal security, including bodily restraint and punishment without due process of law.

48. Defendants Adams and Taylor violated Plaintiff's rights under the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment by using unjustified and unreasonable deadly force against her.

49. Defendants Adams and Taylor's conduct in placing themselves perpendicular to Ms. Barnes' vehicle, firing shots into the vehicle, and shooting her in the lower back, the back of the neck, and back of the head unlawfully subjected her to excessive, unreasonable, and unnecessary physical force.

50. Defendants Adams and Taylor's actions, as described herein, were objectively unreasonable, willful and wanton, in light of the facts and circumstances.

51. The acts and omissions of Defendants Adams and Taylor, described herein, violated Plaintiff's clearly established rights, which reasonable people in Defendants Adams and Taylor's position knew or should have known.

52. As a direct and proximate result of the excessive force used by Defendants Adams and Taylor in shooting at Ms. Barnes, Ms. Barnes suffered conscious physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, incurred medical expenses including all reasonably necessary medical and hospital services furnished, lost future earnings, and suffered other economic and non-economic damages recoverable. Ms. Barnes' right of action for these injuries prior to her death survives in favor of Plaintiff Estate of Crystalline Barnes.

53. As a direct and proximate result of the excessive force used by Defendants Adams and Taylor in shooting at Ms. Barnes, Plaintiffs J.B. and K.H. have incurred all damages cognizable as wrongful death plaintiffs including but not limited to, loss of financial support, loss of services, loss of society, loss of companionship, loss of comfort, loss of attention, loss of advice, loss of counsel, loss of economic damages, and funeral expenses. These injuries, damages and other losses continue into the present and will continue into the foreseeable future.

COUNT II

(§1983 *Monell* Claim – Official Policy and Failure to Train, Discipline, and Supervise)

U.S.C. §1983

Plaintiffs v. Defendant City

54. Plaintiffs refer to, and incorporate by reference, paragraphs 1 through 45 as if fully set forth herein.

55. The JPD and Defendant City, by and through its policymakers, had in force and effect at the time of the conduct complained of in this Complaint, a policy, practice or custom of using excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

56. The JPD and the City of Jackson by and through its policymakers, failed to ensure through custom, policy and/or practice that officers would not use excessive force.

57. The JPD and the City of Jackson by and through its policymakers, had actual or constructive notice of such failures to train, supervise and provide policies to its employees such that it was foreseeable that officers would use excessive force depriving persons, including Crystalline Barnes, of her constitutional right to be free from excessive force.

58. The JPD and the City of Jackson by and through its policymakers, failed to adequately supervise, train or discipline their employees, though it was foreseeable that constitutional violations and harm of the type in Crystalline Barnes' case would be the likely result of such failures.

59. Such failure to train, screen, supervise, and discipline and such unconstitutional municipal customs, practices and/or policies amounted to gross negligence, deliberate indifference, or intentional misconduct which directly and proximately caused the suffering, damages and injuries previously set forth herein.

60. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing policies, failures, practices, or customs, Defendants Adams and Taylor used excessive force in shooting at Ms. Barnes and Ms. Barnes suffered conscious physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, incurred medical expenses including all reasonably necessary medical and hospital services furnished, lost future earnings, and suffered other economic and non-economic damages recoverable. Ms. Barnes' right of action for these injuries prior to her death survives in favor of Plaintiff Estate of Crystalline Barnes.

61. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing policies, failures, practices, or customs, Defendants Adams and Taylor used excessive force in shooting at Ms. Barnes, Plaintiffs J.B. and K.H. have incurred all damages cognizable as wrongful death plaintiffs including but not limited to, loss of financial support, loss of services, loss of society, loss of companionship, loss of comfort, loss of attention, loss of advice, loss of counsel, loss of economic damages, and funeral expenses. These injuries, damages and other losses continue into the present and will continue into the foreseeable future.

COUNT III
(State Law Claim – Civil Conspiracy)
Plaintiffs v. Defendants

62. Plaintiffs refer to, and incorporate by reference, paragraphs 1 through 45 as if fully set forth herein.

63. Defendants Adams, Taylor, and Morris under color of state law, within the scope of their employment as JPD officers, agreed, amongst themselves, and with others, to unlawfully conceal the truth about the circumstances surrounding Crystalline Barnes' shooting, to write the police report in such a manner to hide the truth about the circumstances of Ms. Barnes' slaying, and to obstruct the administration of justice.

64. Defendants Adams and Taylor had an independent stake in the object of the conspiracy, which was to avoid being criminally charged with Ms. Barnes' homicide.

65. Upon information and belief, the misleadingly inaccurate accusations described herein in paragraphs 39-41 were presented to a Hinds County grand jury.

66. An April 2018 Hinds County grand jury report indicates that no indictments were returned related to Ms. Barnes' slaying.

67. Plaintiffs K.B. and J.H. suffered emotional and psychological damages as a result of the foregoing unlawful agreement in that they will be forced to go through the remainder of the lives with the knowledge that no person will be held criminally responsible for unlawfully shooting their mother in the lower back, in the back of the neck, and in the back of the head.

COUNT IV

(State Law Claim – Negligent Hiring, Retention, Discipline, and Supervision)
Plaintiffs v. Defendant City

68. Plaintiffs refer to, and incorporate by reference, paragraphs 1 through 45 as if fully set forth herein.

69. Defendants Adams and Taylor were unfit or incompetent to serve as police officers and use a gun because, *inter alia*, Defendant City failed to properly train, supervise, retain and continue to train in the use of deadly force and to follow the duties and responsibilities contained in the various JPD General Orders related to not shooting at moving vehicles.

70. JPD General Orders provide, in part, “[o]fficers shall not fire at those suspected of committing misdemeanors, nor fire upon persons caught in suspicious circumstances who are not armed and who are not resisting or confronting the officer or any other person, but are merely fleeing from the officer.”

71. By firing at the unarmed Ms. Barnes and shooting her in the lower back, back of the neck, and back of the head, Defendants Adams and Taylor violated several JPD general orders, including the foregoing General Order.

72. Defendant City knew or should have known that Defendants Adams and Taylor were unfit or incompetent because, *inter alia*, it was Defendant City and JPD's failure to properly train and discipline that rendered the officers unfit or incompetent. Defendants Adams and Taylor's incompetence posed a foreseeable risk to the public that the officers would use excessive force.

73. Defendant Adams was unfit or incompetent to serve as a police officer and use a gun on January 27, 2018 because, *inter alia*, Defendant City failed to properly screen her psychological fitness for duty following the November 17, 2017 shooting.

74. Defendant City knew or should have known that Defendant Adams was unfit or incompetent because, *inter alia*, it was Defendant City and JPD's failure to properly screen her for psychological fitness that rendered her unfit or incompetent. Defendant Adams' incompetence posed a foreseeable risk to the public that her psychological unfitness or incompetence would lead to a heightened sense of arousal, an inability to properly assess a person's threat level, or the use of excessive force.

75. Defendants Adams and Taylor's incompetence harmed Plaintiffs in that Defendant Adams and Taylor improperly fired their weapons using excessive force upon Ms. Barnes, and shot her in the lower back, back of the neck, and back of the head.

76. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing failure to properly train, supervise, retain and continue to train, and psychologically screen Defendant Adams, Defendants Adams and Taylor used excessive force in shooting at Ms. Barnes and Ms. Barnes suffered conscious

physical, mental, and emotional pain and suffering, incurred medical expenses including all reasonably necessary medical and hospital services furnished, lost future earnings, and suffered other economic and non-economic damages recoverable. Ms. Barnes' right of action for these injuries prior to her death survives in favor of Plaintiff Estate of Crystalline Barnes.

77. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing failure to properly train, supervise, retain and continue to train, and psychologically screen Defendant Adams, Defendants Adams and Taylor used excessive force in shooting at Ms. Barnes, and Plaintiffs J.B. and K.H. have incurred all damages cognizable as wrongful death plaintiffs including but not limited to, loss of financial support, loss of services, loss of society, loss of companionship, loss of comfort, loss of attention, loss of advice, loss of counsel, loss of economic damages, and funeral expenses. These injuries, damages and other losses continue into the present and will continue into the foreseeable future.

RELIEF REQUESTED

78. Enjoin Defendants from engaging in further misconduct described herein and direct it to take all affirmative steps necessary to properly train officers not to use excessive force on suspects.

79. An order and judgment awarding damages of ten million dollars (\$10,000,000.00) for lost wages and benefits, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life and other non-pecuniary, pre and post judgement interest, attorneys' fees, costs and expert fees, and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

80. An order and judgment awarding punitive damages because Defendant Officers acted with evil motive, actual malice, deliberate oppression, or with willful disregard for Ms. Barnes' rights, and Defendant Adams and Taylor's conduct was outrageous, grossly fraudulent, or

reckless toward Ms. Barnes' safety.


81. An order and judgment retaining jurisdiction over this action to assure full compliance with orders of the court.

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY

Plaintiffs hereby request a trial by jury on each of their claims.


Respectfully submitted,

TUCKER|MOORE GROUP, LLP



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JS 44 (Rev. 12/07)

CIVIL COVER SHEET

3:18cv644-CWR-LRA

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS ESTATE OF CRYSTALINE BARNES, MINOR CHILD JH MINOR CHILD KB

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff HINDS
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

(c) Attorney's (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number)
Tucker Moore Group PC 602-227-1487
P.O. Box 1487 Grenada, MS 38902 9940

DEFENDANTS OFFICER KAKASHA ADAMS OFFICER ALBERT TAYLOR, OFFICER ERIC MORRIS, CITY OF JACKSON

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant HINDS
(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

NOTE: IN LAND SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI LAND INVOLVED. **FILED**

Attorneys (If Known) **SEP 17 2018**

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

1 U.S. Government Plaintiff 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party)

2 U.S. Government Defendant 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff and One Box for Defendant)

Citizen of This State	PTF DEF <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1	Incorporated or Principal Place of Business In This State	PTF DEF <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> 4
Citizen of Another State	<input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 2	Incorporated and Principal Place of Business In Another State	<input type="checkbox"/> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> 5
Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country	<input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 3	Foreign Nation	<input type="checkbox"/> 6 <input type="checkbox"/> 6

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

CONTRACT	TORTS	FORFEITURE/PENALTY	BANKRUPTCY	OTHER STATUTES	
<input type="checkbox"/> 110 Insurance <input type="checkbox"/> 120 Marine <input type="checkbox"/> 130 Miller Act <input type="checkbox"/> 140 Negotiable Instrument <input type="checkbox"/> 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement of Judgment <input type="checkbox"/> 151 Medicare Act <input type="checkbox"/> 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excl. Veterans) <input type="checkbox"/> 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran's Benefits <input type="checkbox"/> 160 Stockholders' Suits <input type="checkbox"/> 190 Other Contract <input type="checkbox"/> 195 Contract Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 196 Franchise	PERSONAL INJURY <input type="checkbox"/> 310 Airplane <input type="checkbox"/> 315 Airplane Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 320 Assault, Libel & Slander <input type="checkbox"/> 330 Federal Employers' Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 340 Marine <input type="checkbox"/> 345 Marine Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 350 Motor Vehicle <input type="checkbox"/> 355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 360 Other Personal Injury	PERSONAL INJURY <input type="checkbox"/> 362 Personal Injury - Med. Malpractice <input type="checkbox"/> 365 Personal Injury - Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY <input type="checkbox"/> 370 Other Fraud <input type="checkbox"/> 371 Truth in Lending <input type="checkbox"/> 380 Other Personal Property Damage <input type="checkbox"/> 385 Property Damage Product Liability	<input type="checkbox"/> 610 Agriculture <input type="checkbox"/> 620 Other Food & Drug <input type="checkbox"/> 625 Drug Related Seizure of Property 21 USC 881 <input type="checkbox"/> 630 Liquor Laws <input type="checkbox"/> 640 R.R. & Truck <input type="checkbox"/> 650 Airline Regs. <input type="checkbox"/> 660 Occupational Safety/Health <input type="checkbox"/> 690 Other LABOR <input type="checkbox"/> 710 Fair Labor Standards Act <input type="checkbox"/> 720 Labor/Mgmt. Relations <input type="checkbox"/> 730 Labor/Mgmt. Reporting & Disclosure Act <input type="checkbox"/> 740 Railway Labor Act <input type="checkbox"/> 790 Other Labor Litigation <input type="checkbox"/> 791 Empl. Ret. Inc. Security Act IMMIGRATION <input type="checkbox"/> 462 Naturalization Application <input type="checkbox"/> 463 Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee <input type="checkbox"/> 465 Other Immigration Actions	<input type="checkbox"/> 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 <input type="checkbox"/> 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 PROPERTY RIGHTS <input type="checkbox"/> 820 Copyrights <input type="checkbox"/> 830 Patent <input type="checkbox"/> 840 Trademark SOCIAL SECURITY <input type="checkbox"/> 861 HIA (1395ff) <input type="checkbox"/> 862 Black Lung (923) <input type="checkbox"/> 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) <input type="checkbox"/> 864 SSID Title XVI <input type="checkbox"/> 865 RSI (405(g)) FEDERAL TAX SUITS <input type="checkbox"/> 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) <input type="checkbox"/> 871 IRS—Third Party 26 USC 7609	<input type="checkbox"/> 400 State Reapportionment <input type="checkbox"/> 410 Antitrust <input type="checkbox"/> 430 Banks and Banking <input type="checkbox"/> 450 Commerce <input type="checkbox"/> 460 Deportation <input type="checkbox"/> 470 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations <input type="checkbox"/> 480 Consumer Credit <input type="checkbox"/> 490 Cable/Sat TV <input type="checkbox"/> 810 Selective Service <input type="checkbox"/> 850 Securities/Commodities/Exchange <input type="checkbox"/> 875 Customer Challenge 12 USC 3410 <input type="checkbox"/> 890 Other Statutory Actions <input type="checkbox"/> 891 Agricultural Acts <input type="checkbox"/> 892 Economic Stabilization Act <input type="checkbox"/> 893 Environmental Matters <input type="checkbox"/> 894 Energy Allocation Act <input type="checkbox"/> 895 Freedom of Information Act <input type="checkbox"/> 900 Appeal of Fee Determination Under Equal Access to Justice <input type="checkbox"/> 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes
REAL PROPERTY <input type="checkbox"/> 210 Land Condemnation <input type="checkbox"/> 220 Foreclosure <input type="checkbox"/> 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment <input type="checkbox"/> 240 Torts to Land <input type="checkbox"/> 245 Tort Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 290 All Other Real Property	CIVIL RIGHTS <input type="checkbox"/> 441 Voting <input type="checkbox"/> 442 Employment <input type="checkbox"/> 443 Housing/Accommodations <input type="checkbox"/> 444 Welfare <input type="checkbox"/> 445 Amer. w/Disabilities - Employment <input type="checkbox"/> 446 Amer. w/Disabilities - Other <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 440 Other Civil Rights	PRISONER PETITIONS <input type="checkbox"/> 510 Motions to Vacate Sentence Habeas Corpus: <input type="checkbox"/> 530 General <input type="checkbox"/> 535 Death Penalty <input type="checkbox"/> 540 Mandamus & Other <input type="checkbox"/> 550 Civil Rights <input type="checkbox"/> 555 Prison Condition			

V. ORIGIN (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

1 Original Proceeding 2 Removed from State Court 3 Remanded from Appellate Court 4 Reinstated or Reopened 5 Transferred from another district (specify) 6 Multidistrict Litigation 7 Appeal to District Judge from Magistrate Judgement

Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):
42 USC 1983

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION
Brief description of cause: officers used excessive force

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT: CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER F.R.C.P. 23 **DEMAND \$** 10,000,000.00 CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint: **JURY DEMAND:** Yes No

VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY (See instructions): JUDGE _____ DOCKET NUMBER _____

DATE 9/17/18 SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD Carlo E. Moore [Signature]

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY
RECEIPT # _____ AMOUNT _____ APPLYING IFP _____ JUDGE _____ MAG. JUDGE _____
34643051818